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TOO BIG TO CARE?: FINANCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE PROBLEM OF 
TRANSACTIONAL ASYMMETRY 
 
TT ARVIND* 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The primary focus of the policy debate on enhancing financial inclusion for small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) KDVEHHQRQWKHLVVXHRI60(V·access to finance and the 
steps that can be taken to improve it.1  This preoccupation is also visible in the 
literature on SME finance where, again, the primary focus has been on policy measures 
and frameworks that increase the availability of external finance for SMEs.2  At one 
level, this focus is both understandable and logical.  It has been clear for at least three 
decades that SMEs are more dependent on banks for finance than are larger firms, 3 
and that this reflects SME·V JUHDWHU QHHG IRU WKDW VSHFLILF IRUP RI ILQDQFH in 
comparison with larger firms. Broader forms of finance such as supplier finance or 
leasing are insufficient to fully meet the requirements of SMEs for finance. 4   
 
In its fullest sense, however, financial inclusion raises issues that go well 
beyond the bare LVVXHRI60(V·access to finance.  As tKH:RUOG%DQN·VGHILQLWLRQRI
financial inclusion emphasises, financial inclusion as a concept and policy agenda 
brings together three distinct, and not necessarily correlated, issues: that of ensuring 
access to useful and affordable finance, that of ensuring that the financial products 
and technologies that are available meet the actual needs of financial users, and that 
of ensuring that the delivery of finance is both responsible and sustainable.5  Whilst 
the focus of much of the existing work has understandably been on the first of these, 
the second and third also matter.  There is, in particular, an obvious need to assess 
                                                 
* York Law School, University of York, UK. Email: t.t.arvind@york.ac.uk  
1 7KHSULPDU\ IRFXVRIWKH:RUOG%DQN·V)LQDQFLDO ,QFOXVLRQ*OREDO,QLWLDWLYHIRUH[DPSOHKDVEHHQ
RQLWV´8QLYHUVDO )LQDQFLDO $FFHVV µJRDOHYHQ WKRXJKDVGLVFXVVHGEHORZLWVRZQGHILQLWLRQLI
inclusivity incorporates a much broader range of features (see inf ra note 5).  WORLD BANK, 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION GLOBAL INITIATIVE (FIGI), 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/brief/figi (last accessed 30 September 
2020). 
2 See eg AN Berger & GF Udell, A more complete conceptual f ramework for SME Finance, 30 J BANK. & FIN.  
2945 (2006). 
3 M Pedersen & R Rajan, The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from small business data, 49 
J FINANCE 3 (1994) 
4 T Beck et al, Financing patters around the world: are small firms different?, 25 J FIN. ECON. 467 
(2008) 
5 WORLD BANK, FINANCIAL INCLUSION OVERVIEW, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/overview (last accessed 30 September 
´)LQDQFLDO LQFOXVLRQPHDQVWKDWLQGLYLGXDOVDQGEXVLQHVVHVKDYHDFFHVV WRXVHIXOand affordable 
financial products and services that meet their needs ² transactions, payments, savings, credit and 
insurance ² GHOLYHUHG LQDUHVSRQVLEOHDQGVXVWDLQDEOHZD\µ 
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what it means IRU60(ILQDQFHWREH¶UHVSRQVLEOH·DQG¶VXVWDLQDEOH·, whether current 
systems of SME finance meet that standard and, if not, then what might be preventing 
them from doing so, and what sort of policy measures or frameworks might be 
necessary to deal with the underlying issues. 
 
This article seeks to contribute to that debate.  Its principal argument is that 
the sustainability and resilience of SME finance depends to a far greater degree than 
is usually acknowledged on the actual terms of the financial contracts under which 
banks lend to SMEs, and that this impact is particularly strongly felt in times of 
financial crises.  Prior research has shown that bank finance acts as a constraint on 
SMEs6 in a way it does not for large firms,7 that these constraints have a non-trivial 
impact on SME performance in a manner that is amplified during crises,8 and that the 
nature and extent of this impact are strongly influenced by the actual lending 
behaviour and practices of banks.9  Prior research has also shown that SMEs have a 
limited ability to influence the terms on which they access finance, particularly when 
they are dealing with rule-based, rather than more discretionary relationship-based, 
lending.10  This article argues that these issues reflect a deeper underlying factor, 
namely, that SME lending is typically governed by terms which give banks the ability 
to, and a strong incentive to, engage in ways that constrain, disrupt, and potentially 
cause considerable financial distress to SMEs during economic downturns.  
 
There is a strong parallel between the concerns of the present article and those 
of the literature on relationship lending.  Since the 1990s, an important theme in the 
literature on SME finance has been the argument that the financial needs of SMEs 
and, thus, the broader goal of financial inclusion and sustainability for SMEs, are better 
served by ¶UHODWLRQVKLSOHQGLQJ·ZKHUHGHFLVLRQVRQILQDQFLQJDUHEDVHGRQ¶VRIW·GDWD
and MXGJHPHQWVIRUPHGWKURXJKUHODWLRQVKLSVDQGLQWHUDFWLRQUDWKHUWKDQ¶KLHUDUFKLFDO·
lending where decisions DUHPDGHDWDUPV·OHQJWKDQGDUHSULPDULO\EDVHGRQ¶KDUG·
quantitative data.11  The arguments of this article are in sympathy with that literature, 
which it seeks to extend by analysing the impact of relationship-based lending not just 
RQEDQNV·GHFLVLRQV on whether or not to lend to a borrower, but also on their broader 
approach to managing the lender³borrower relationship.  In doing so, this article 
does not seek to argue that the issues it discusses are more significant than the issue 
of access to finance.  It seeks, rather, to argue that they are also problematic, and need 
to be addressed in any policy agenda directed towards financial inclusion.  There have 
                                                 
6 T Beck et al, The determinants of  f inancing obstacles, 25 J INTL. MONEY & FINANCE 932 (2006) 
7 T Beck et al, Financial and legal constraints to firm growth: does firm size matter?, 60 J FINANCE 137 
(2005) 
8 M Campello et al, The real effects of financial constraints: evidence from a financial crisis 97 J FIN.  
ECON. 470 (2010) 
9 P Behr et al, Financial constraints of private firms and bank lending behavior, 37 J BANK. & FIN. 3472  
(2013) 
10 J Grunert & L Norden, Bargaining power and information in SME lending  29 SMALL BUS. ECON. 401 
(2012).  On the distinction between rule-based and relationship-based lending, see G Cerqueiro et al, 
Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting  20 J FIN INTERMEDIATION 503 (2011) 
11 See esp. JM Liberty & A Mian, Estimating the ef f ect of  hierarchies on information use 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 
4057 (2009) 
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been several measures taken in recent years to protect SMEs from lender overreach, 
such as the US 6PDOO%XVLQHVV5HRUJDQL]DWLRQ$FWRI WKH´6%5$µ 12 and the 
idea of financial inclusion offers a promising basis on which to integrate them into a 
more complete policy agenda. 
 
Part II of this article outlines the basic factual underpinnings of the argument, 
namely, that EDQNV·loan management practices have a negative effect on the overall 
resilience of SMEs in times of crises, and that these practices are enabled and 
facilitated by the terms and conditions of contracts.  The focus of the Part is on two 
case studies, both exploring lender practices in relation to SMEs, and cumulatively 
demonstrating that these practices have a broader impact on financial inclusion which 
goes beyond the SMEs themselves.  Part III argues that a proper understanding of the 
problem requires an engagement with contract theory and, in particular, relational 
contract theory.  I identify two theoretical models of SME lending, one of which treats 
the contracts that underpin them as simple, discrete, and wholly unrelational contracts, 
while the other treats them as relational contracts whose effect is to create frameworks 
of private governance that supplant and supersede the priorities, interests, and 
outcomes embedded in public governance frameworks. I argue that the relational 
model is superior in its ability to explain the nature of financial contracts and provide 
a diagnosis of their impact.  Part IV argues that addressing the resulting problems 
requires the law to take an active role in governing governance, by explicitly favouring 
and seeking to encourage relational lending.  Drawing on the literature on corporate 
pluralism and negotiated economies, I outline a policy framework and agenda that can 
successfully address the issues this article identifies while also avoiding the dangers of 
overregulation.  Part V summarises and concludes the discussion.  
 
 
II. FINANCIAL CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION: THE 
IMPACT OF BANK-SME ASYMMETRY 
 
There is now a considerable body of work examining different models of lending to 
SMEs.  0XFKRIWKLVOLWHUDWXUHKDVIRFXVHGRQWZRW\SHVRIILQDQFHRUWZR¶ lending 
WHFKQRORJLHV·,13 DVWKH\KDYHFRPHWREHFDOOHG¶UHODWLRQVKLS·lending on the one hand, 
DQG¶KLHUDUFKLFDO·¶WUDQVDFWLRQDO· RU¶DUPV-OHQJWK·lending on the other.  Relationship 
lending is usually taken to be associated with smaller local or community banks, whose 
decision-making is informed by soft and less easily quantifiable information that has 
been gathered by individual loan officers14 over the course of a sustained lending 
relationship with the borrower in question.15  Hierarchical lending, in contrast, is 
usually associated with larger banks, or with foreign banks, who make lending 
                                                 
12 Small Business Reorganization Act (SBRA) of 2019, Pub. L. No. 11654, 133 Stat. 1079 
13 Berger & Udell, supra note 2, 2946 
14 H Uchida et al, Loan of f icers and relationship lending to SMEs, 21 J FIN. INTERMEDIATION 97 (2012) 
15 A Berger & GF Udell, Universal banking and the future of  small business lending , in FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
DESIGN: THE CASE FOR UNIVERSAL BANKING (A Saunders & I Walter eds, 1996), 559³627 
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decisions based on models informed by hard quantified data, with loan officers having 
a lower degree of discretion and soft information playing a much more limited role.16   
 
Relationship lending and hierarchical lending are better regarded as ideal 
types17 rather than strictly empirical categories.  More recent work has shown that 
banks can and do deploy them in complementary ways,18 and that there is considerable 
diversity within each category.19 Nevertheless, research also suggests that the 
categories do in fact encapsulate important differences in the way banks approach 
SME lending, even if the boundaries between them are somewhat less bright-line than 
they were initially thought to be.  The origins of this body of work lie in a concern 
with understanding the implications of transaction costs and information asymmetries 
on financial markets and, specifically, the impact of the informational opacity20 of 
SME finances to banks seeking to assess their creditworthiness. 21  A strong 
relationship between a borrower and a bank, and the concomitant ability to form 
judgements based on qualitative rather than quantitative information, was seen as an 
obvious and efficient way to overcome these information asymmetries22 and avoid the 
credit rationing to which prevailing theory predicted imperfect information would 
otherwise give rise.23  Early scholars in this tradition therefore focused on assessing 
whether community banks ought to play a central role in SME lending because of 
their superior ability to engage in relationship lending. 24 More recent work has focused 
on the question of whether newer advances in risk modelling have enabled hierarchical 
or transactional lending (and, thus, larger banks) to play a broader role in SME finance, 
notwithstanding the informational opacity of SMEs.25  
 
Overwhelmingly, however, the focus of this literature has been on evaluating 
the two as lending technologies, approached from the perspective of their effectiveness 
at providing access to finance. Research carried out after the financial crisis has, in 
contrast, begun to show that relationship lending and hierarchical lending also 
produce different outcomes in relation to the subsequent course of the banker³
borrower relationship.  It has, for example, been shown that hierarchical lending is 
                                                 
16 A Mian, Distance constraints: the limits of foreign lending in poor economies 61 J FIN. 1465 (2006) 
17 7KH FRQFHSW RI DQ ¶LGHDO W\SH· ZDV IRUPXODWHG E\ 0D[ Weber, who posited them as idealised  
constructs that model certain aspects of social reality in a manner that enables us to draw broader 
inferences about the empirical phenomena to which they refer, even though in practice most objects  
treated as an instance of an ideal type will deviate from the ideal.  M WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1969), 90³103 
18 F Bartoli et al, SME financing and the choice of lending technology in Italy: Complementarity or 
substitutability?, 31 J. BANK. & FIN. 5476 (2013) 
19 Berger & Udell, supra note 2, 2946 
20 Petersen & Rajan, supra note 3. 
21 *)8GHOO:KDW·VLQDUHODWLRQVKLS"7KHFDVH RIFRPPHUFLDO OHQGLQJBUS. HORIZ. 93, 95 (2008) 
22 J Stein, Information production and capital allocation: decentralized vs hierarchical firms 57 J FIN.  
1891 (2002) 
23 J Stiglitz & A Weiss, Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information 71 AM ECON REV 393 
(1981) 
24 JA Scott, Small business and the value of community financial institutions, 25 J FIN. SERV. RES. 207 
(2004) 
25 T Beck et al, Bank Financing for SMEs: Evidence across countries and bank ownership types, 39 J FIN. SERV. 
RES. 35 (2011); Berger & Udell, supra note 2, 2946³7. 
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likelier than relationship lending based on soft data to result in credit rationing to 
SMEs in times of crises.26  Studies have DOVRLGHQWLILHGDVWURQJ¶IOLJKWKRPH·HIIHFW
across borders,27 DQGHYHQD¶IOLJKWWRKHDGTXDUWHUV·HIIHFWZLWKLQDVLQJOHFRXQWU\ 28 in 
which lending patterns associated with hierarchical lending are more likely to result in 
banks cutting or eliminating facilities for SMEs during a crisis.  Relationship lending, 
in contrast, appears to reduce SME credit rationing or, at least, to mitigate its effects.29 
 
Crucially, and as discussed in more detail below, reports commissioned by 
lawmakers and legislators in the UK suggest that this difference also applies to other 
dimensions of the lender³borrower relationship, and in particular to the way in which 
banks engage with covenants in loan agreements with SMEs.  Loan agreements 
incorporate a range of financial covenants which, typically, serve a dual purpose.  
Firstly, they enable the lender to monitor the performance of the borrower during the 
period of the borrowing.30 Secondly, because the breach of a financial covenant 
constitutes a technical default giving the lender significant powers of control, financial 
covenants also enable lenders to limit credit loss either directly by assuming control, 
or through renegotiation by wielding the threat of assuming control as a bargaining 
tool.31   
 
There are sound reasons for loan agreements to have such provisions.  
Financial contracts are typically incomplete contracts in that they can neither foresee 
nor provide for even a reasonable proportion of the eventualities that might arise 
GXULQJWKHFRQWUDFW·VWHUP.  The use of flexible terms, including unilateral powers, is 
an established way of dealing with this issue.32 In the context of financial lending, 
covenants providing for a combination of monitoring and control are a particularly 
efficient way of dealing not just with incompleteness33 but also with the broader issue 
of uncertainty.34  Nevertheless, the nature and extent of the control given to lenders 
by these provisions also creates serious risks for SMEs.  Given the limited negotiating 
power of SMEs in hierarchical lending, and the significantly higher degree of switching 
costs they face due to their informational opacity35 and the sunk costs of information 
                                                 
26 Bartoli et al, supra note 18 
27 M Giannetti & L Laven, The flight home effect: Evidence from the syndicated loan market during 
financial crises, 104 J FIN. ECON. 23 (2012) 
28 H Degryse et al, SMEs and access to bank credit: Evidence on the regional proposition of the 
financial crisis in the UK, 38 J FIN. STAB. 53 (2018) 
29 M Cotugno et al, Relationship lending, hierarchical distance and credit tightening: Evidence from the 
financial crisis, 37 J BANK. & FIN. 1372 (2013) 
30 M Berlin & J Loeys, Bond Covenants and delegated monitoring , 43 J FIN. 397 (1992) 
31 CW Smith & JB Warner, On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants, 7 J FIN. ECON. 
117 (1979) 
32 AW Katz, Contractual Incompleteness: A Transactional Perspective, 56 CASE WEST RES LR 169 
(2005) 
33 P Aghion & P Bolton, An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting, 59 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 473 (1992) 
34 PR Demerjian, Uncertainty and debt covenants, 22 REV. ACCOUNT. STUD. 1156 (2017) 
35 C Howorth et al, An examination of  the factors associated with bank switching in the UK Small Firm Sector , 20 
SMALL. BUS. ECON. 305 (2003). Subsequent developments are likely to have increased switching costs,  
in that hierarchical lending to SMEs now typically involves a suite of loan and non-loan products, thus 
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provision,36 there is a significant risk that lenders may opportunistically use the powers 
they acquire under financial contracts to extract a financial windfall in situations where 
the risk that the SME will fail or be unable to meet its debts is not high.  The powers 
conferred on lenders by financial covenants in effect act as a ¶hostage· in the sense 
identified by Williamson in his classic article,37 but with the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour by the hostage-taker (the bank) remaining wholly unmitigated.   
 
Two sets of cases from the UK involving lender behaviour vis-à-vis SMEs 
demonstrate that this risk is real, and that it can have significant adverse consequences 
not only for borrowers but also for a broader community of stakeholders.  The first 
of these cases arose following the post-2007 financial crisis out of the actions of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) in connections to loans it had made SMEs.38  Prior to 
the crisis, RBS had made itself the largest lender to SMEs in the UK.39  Part of its 
approach to SME lending involved referring SMEs to one of its internal turnaround 
units if they exhibited signs of financial difficulty.  The task of these units was to assess 
whether the business was viable and, if it was, to restore it to financial health drawing 
on expertise within the turnaround unit.40  ,IKRZHYHUWKHERUURZHU·VEXVLQHVVZDV
judged not to be viable, RBS would move to taking recovery action against the 
borrower, a process that usually led to the business being liquidated.41   
 
The process of turnaround was not, however, necessarily UXQLQWKHERUURZHU·V
LQWHUHVW5%6·VLQWHUQDOGRFXPHQWDWLRQHPSKDVLVHGWKHQHHGWRWUHDWFXVWRPHUV¶IDLUO\
DQGVHQVLWLYHO\·42 but the primary purpose of turnaround was to assist RBS in securing 
its own financial position. Turnaround was a largely unregulated activity, and there 
were in consequence few external constraints on how RBS treated borrowers.43 Whilst 
there was a potential congruence of interests between RBS and its borrowers in 
situations where 5%6·VRZQ LQWHUHVWVZHUHEHVWVHUYHGE\DVVLVWLQJWKHERUURZHU WR
return to a sustainable financial position44 LQWHUQDOO\FDOOHG¶UHWXUQWRVDWLVIDFWRU\·RU
¶576·LWFRXOGQRW EHDVVXPHGWKDW5%6ZRXOG invariably perceive its interests as 
                                                 
increasing the cost of switching. A de la Torre et al, Bank involvement with SMEs: Beyond relationship lending, 
34 BANK. & FIN. 2280 (2010) 
36 Cotugno et al, supra note 29, 1376³77. 
37 O Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 
519 (1983) 
38 Three reports were commissioned into this crisis: LAWRENCE TOMLINSON, BANKS· LENDING 
PRACTICES: TREATMENT OF BUSINESS IN DISTRESS KHUHLQDIWHU ¶7RPOLQVRQ5HSRUW·ANDREW 
LARGE, RBS INDEPENDENT LENDING REVIEW  KHUHLQDIWHU ¶/DUJH 5HYLHZ· Dnd 
PROMONTORY FINANCIAL GROUP, RBS GROUP·S TREATMENT OF SME CUSTOMERS REFERRED TO 
THE GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING GROUP: A REPORT UNDER SECTION 166 OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AND MARKETS ACT 2000 KHUHLQDIWHU ´3URPRQWRU\5HSRUWµ7KHDFFRXQW LQWKLVDUWLcle draws 
on the material set out in these reports. 
39 LARGE REVIEW, supra note 38, 24³5 
40 PROMONTORY REPORT, supra note 38, para 4.2.2 
41 LARGE REVIEW, supra note 38, 47. 
42 GRG PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE MANUAL (2010), quoted in PROMONTORY REPORT, supra note 
38, para 1.38 
43 PROMONTORY REPORT, supra note 38, para 2.1.56 
44 LARGE REVIEW, supra note 38, 47 
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lying in RTS even in situations where RTS was factually possible.45  As a result, SMEs 
sent into the turnaround process always IDFHGWKHULVNWKDW5%6·VWXUQDURXQGXQLWV
would prioritise other commercial considerations over returning the borrower to 
KHDOWKDQGZRXOGLQFRQVHTXHQFHDFWLQDZD\WKDWH[DFHUEDWHGWKH60(·VILQDQFLDO
distress sending a potentially viable business into insolvency.  It was precisely this risk 
that eventuated in the aftermath of the crisis. 
 
2QHRI5%6·VXQLWVZDVWKH*OREDO5HVWUXFWXULQJ*URXS *5* .  This was 
originally a small, specialised unit46 but, after the post-2007 financial crisis it came to 
play a central part in the process by which RBS managed its debt.  The number of 
SMEs referred to the GRG (or its local UK-based unit, the BRG) rose from 738 in 
2008 to 1497 in 2009, and a total of 5,900 SME cases were referred to it between 2008 
and 2013.47  There were two reasons for the increase.  The crisis had led to many SME 
customers breaching financial covenants,48 but LWDOVROHGWRDFKDQJHLQ5%6·Vappetite 
for risk.  After the crisis, RBS sought to reduce its exposure to certain sectors and 
certain types of customers, including SMEs.49  The GRG became one of the 
instruments deployed to achieve this end, with referrals to it being used to address 
poor lending or pricing decisions.50  As a result, the process of turnaround came to be 
used not just to rehabilitate and restore to financial health customers in financial 
distress, but also to be a source of revenue which contributed to 5%6·s revenue 
through its margin fees and other revenue-generating mechanisms, as well as to 
protecting 5%6·V capital, reducing its exposure, and helping it meet relevant metrics.51  
7KH*5*·V performance was, accordingly, measured not in terms of SMEs saved, but 
in terms of its performance in helping RBS achieve its goal of reducing facility levels, 
DQGLWVFRQWULEXWLRQWR5%6·VRYHUDOOLQFRPH52  
 
The result was that SMEs were repeatedly and frequently treated in ways that 
exacerbated their financial difficulties.  In practice, GRG placed little emphasis on 
turnaround, or on returning customers to financial health and mainstream banking 
through genuine business restructuring.53 Relationship managers within GRG were 
often not provided with the tools that would be necessary to support an analysis of 
turnaround options.54  Instead, GRG strove to reduce facility levels without regard to 
the impact on borrowers, and to increase profits by increasing prices and exploiting 
leverage opportunities in non-transparent ways.55  SMEs referred to GRG were hit 
with management fees, arrangement fees, exit fees, risk fees, and waiver fees, amongst 
                                                 
45 Id., 52. 
46 PROMONTORY REPORT, supra note 38, para 2.1.46 
47 Id., para 2.1.47 
48 Id., para 2.1.40 
49 LARGE REVIEW, supra note 38, 29. 
50 PROMONTORY REPORT, supra note 38, para 2.1.42 
51 PROMONTORY REPORT, supra note 38, para 3.1.3 
52 Id., para 3.1.29³3.1.40. 
53 Id., para 4.2.63³4.2.65 
54 Id., para 4.2.46 
55 Id., para 4.2.61 
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others, 56 and the GRG invented new instruments which adversely affected the 
SRVLWLRQRIWKHVKDUHKROGHUVRI60(V2QHH[DPSOHZDVWKH¶XSVLGHLQVWUXPHQW·,Q
form, this instrument was designed to obtain an appropriate return for the increased 
risk RBS incurred in continuing to support businesses which were showing signs of 
financial distress or fell outside current lending criteria,57 and it was in theory linked 
to the growth in the value of the ERUURZHU·VVKDUHV.58  In practice, however, it was 
treated as simply another stream of income59 GHOLQNHGIURP WKHERUURZHU·V DFWXDO
needs, and was often used opportunistically to create a windfall profit rather than on 
any analysis of what was an appropriate price or an appropriate return for the actual 
risk RBS had incurred.60 
 
This conduct would have been less problematic had it related primarily to 
distressed businesses that were likely to have to close.  However, subsequent reviews 
showed that approximately 66% of the SMEs referred to the GRG were viable and 
could have been turned around.61  Despite this, 92% of these viable SMEs were treated 
inappropriately,62 and in 16% of cases the result was to cause material financial distress 
to the SME borrower.63  Viable SMEs were pushed on a journey towards 
administration, receivership and liquidation.  Adverse outcomes were particularly 
likely in trading-based businesses, with 22% of viable trading-based businesses sent 
into turnaround experiencing material financial distress as a result of RBS·V actions.64   
 
From the perspective of financial inclusion, this trend is a cause for concern.  
Although WKHLVVXHVUDLVHGE\5%6·VSUDFWLFHVGRQRWWRXFKRQWKHLVVXHRIDFFHVVWR
finance, it is hard to see how the practices in question could be said to be either 
responsible or sustainable.  In addition, other cases from the UK demonstrate that the 
impact of these practices reached beyond the borrower itself, to also encompass a 
broader category of stakeholders.  The failure of Farepak serves as a good illustration.65  
Farepak was a Christmas savings company.  Christmas savings companies in the UK 
appeal primarily to poorer and unbanked families, and operate by convincing these 
families to make periodic payments into the savings scheme over the course of a year, 
which is put towards the cost of a Christmas hamper and Christmas shopping 
vouchers provided by the company.  Farepak had a long history as a Christmas saving 
scheme, but it ran into financial trouble in 2006.  Its directors made what a court 
would later describe DV¶JHQXLQHVWUHQXRXVHIIRUWV·WRVDYHWKHJURXSDQGLQSDUWLFXODU
                                                 
56 Id., para 4.2.78 
57 Id., para 5.2.7 
58 Id., para 5.2.24 
59 Id., para 5.2.30 
60 Id., para 5.2.47 
61 Id., para 6.2.53 
62 Id., para 6.2.85 
63 Id., para 6.2.53 
64 Id., para 6.2.57 
65 7KH DFFRXQW SUHVHQWHG KHUH LVWDNHQ IURPD -XGJH·V6WDWHPHQW PDGHE\ -XVWLFH 3HWHU 6PLWKLQWKH
case of Secretary of State v. Fowler on 21 June 2012.  See Courts and Tribunals Judiciary, Secretary of  
State v Fowler and others: Day 15 ² -XGJH·V6WDWHPHQW , https://www.judiciary.uk/judgments/farepak-judges-
statement/ ODVWDFFHVVHG 6HSWHPEHU KHUHLQDIWHU ´)DUHSDN -XGJH·V6WDWHPHQWµ 
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protect the interests of its depositors.66  A number of proposals were put forward 
which offered a material prospect of preserving the business, some of which involved 
significant sacrifices by shareholders.67  However, tKH FRPSDQ\·V EDQNHUVHBOS, 
refused to permit any of these to be put into effect (as they were entitled to do under 
the loan agreement).  The view HBOS took was that insolvency was not only 
inevitable, but it was IURP +%26·VSHUVSHFWLYHWKH preferred outcome, as their 
FKDUJHRYHU)DUHSDN·VDVVHWVZRXOGHQDEOHWKHPWR´PD[LPLVHWKHLUUHWXUQDVTXLFNO\
DVSRVVLEOHµLQDQLQVROYHQF\68  As a result, and following what the judge described as 
´D SROLcy of playing hardball, of which it appeared to be proud, and conceding 
QRWKLQJµ69 HBOS used its contractual powers to compel Farepak to continue to 
FROOHFWGHSRVLWVIURPVDYHUVXQWLOVXFKWLPHDVWKHUHZDVHQRXJKPRQH\LQ)DUHSDN·V
bank account to fully satisfy its debt to HBOS, at which time HBOS took Farepak 
into insolvency.70  Whilst HBOS fully recovered its money, )DUHSDN·VGHSRVLWRUV 
recovered next to nothing. 
 
 
III. CONTRACTUAL POWER AND TRANSACTIONAL ASYMMETRY: 
TOWARDS A DIAGNOSIS 
 
Three broad themes emerge from the literature and cases material discussed in Part II 
of this article.  The first is that hierarchical lending, a category into which both the 
5%6ORDQVWR60(VDQG+%26·VORDQWR)DUHSDNIDOOKDVHIIHFWVRQILQDQFLDOLQFOXVLRQ
that stretch well beyond the narrow issue of access to finance, which has been the 
main focus of the literature.  The manner in which banks approach hierarchical lending 
has non-trivial effects not just on access to finance, but also the sustainability and 
resilience of the borrower and other stakeholders.  The second is that ordinary 
approaches to financial regulation are not in and of themselves well-equipped to deal 
with the challenges that hierarchical lending creates for SMEs over the lifetime of the 
loan.  In both the UK cases discussed above, the regulator had a somewhat limited 
power to take action against the bank, because the case related to commercial 
lending,71 but they also appeared reluctant to use the powers they did have.72  In the 
                                                 
66 Id., para 20 
67 Id., para 119 
68 Id., para 112 
69 Id., para 20 
70 Id, para 118 
71 In evidence to the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons, Andrew Bailey³then the Chief 
([HFXWLYH RIWKH)LQDQFLDO &RQGXFW$XWKRULW\WKH8.·VPDLQILQDQFLDO UHJXODWRU\³repeatedly argued 
WKDW5%6·V FRQGXFW OD\ outwith the perimeter of its regulatory powers at the time.  Although he also 
accepted that the powers had since been amended to bring commercial lending within the scope of the 
)&$·V DXWKRULW\ KH WRRN WKH YLHZ WKDW LW ZRXOG EH LPSURSHU WR DSSO\ WKDW H[SDnded power 
retrospectively.  See TREASURY COMMITTEE, ORAL EVIDENCE: THE WORK OF THE FINANCIAL 
CONDUCT AUTHORITY, HC 475, Q11 (31 October 2017), 
data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Treasury/The 
work of the Financial Conduct Authority/Oral/72428.html (last accessed 6 October 2020) 
72 A report by the Treasury Committee in 2019 pointed out that the FCA did in fact have the power 
to take action even beyond the perimeter of regulation, albeit in a more limited way; and these 
limitations led it to prioritise its resources to focus on activities in the perimeter.  See TREASURY 
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RBS cases, for example, the regulator initially refused to publish a report it had 
FRPPLVVLRQHGLQWR5%6·VSUDFWLFHVDQGWKHreport did not ultimately become public 
until it was obtained by a Parliamentary committee which proceeded to publish it. 73  
In relation to Farepak, the response of regulators was not to proceed against the bank, 
but instead to prosecute and seek to disqualify the directors of Farepak.  The full 
QDWXUHRIWKHEDQN·VFRQGXFWRQO\became public when judge presiding over the trial 
took the unusual decision while acquitting the directors to make a judicial statement 
setting out how it was in fact WKHEDQN·VFRQGuct that had brought about WKHFRPSDQ\·V
collapse and the loss by the depositors of their money.74  
 
The third, and arguably most significant, theme that emerges from the 
discussion in this Part relates to the role of contracts and contract law.  The lender·V
ability to exercise a high degree of control over the borrower had an entirely 
contractual basis, as did WKHOHQGHU·VIUHHGRPWRXVHWKDWFRQWUROLQDZD\WKDWZHUH
both opportunistic and to the detriment of the borrower.  This was emphasised by the 
judge hearing the Farepak action,75 as well as by the reviews commissioned by the UK 
government and the Financial Conduct Authority (the main financial regulator in the 
UK) into RBS·s lending practices.  A key finding of these reviews was that the 5%6·V
right to exercise a high degree of control over companies was wholly contractual.  The 
lending contracts between RBS and SMEs gave it a wide discretion which let it use a 
technical breach as leverage over SMEs.76 The reviews also found that a major factor 
underlying this was that the nature of the interaction between SMEs and banks meant 
that the balance of power had tipped too far in favour of banks.  There was no longer 
D´OHYHOSOD\LQJILHOGµIRUEDQNLQJDJUHHPHQWVDQGWKHPDUNHWdid not let borrowers 
make informed decisions on risk and reward.77 Contracts were imbalanced, and whilst 
there was a broad expectation that banks would exercise their contractual powers in 
good faith and in a fair, transparent, and reasonable manner,78 this expectation had no 
basis in law and in practice things were often otherwise.79 For example, there was 
evidence the RBS had used its contractual discretion to send businesses which were 
not in financial difficulties but were simply in legal disputes with it into turnaround.80  
There was accordingly a need to give SMEs legal protection against ´heavy handed, 
profiteering, and abhorrent behaviourµ81 by banks, and to ´rebalance the relationship 
                                                 
COMMITTEE, THE WORK OF THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY: THE PERIMETER OF 
REGULATION, (Thirty-fifth report, Commons session 2017-19), paras 19-22 (24 July 2019), 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmtreasy/2594/2594.pdf (last accessed 6 
October 2020)  
73 HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY, DEBATE PACK NUMBER CDP-2018-093: DEBATE ON REDRESS 
FOR VICTIMS OF BANKING MISCONDUCT AND THE FCA (2018), 
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cdp-2018-0093/ (last accessed 30 
September 2020), 9. 
74 )DUHSDN -XGJH·V6WDWHPHQW , supra note 65, para 77 
75 Id., para 120 
76 PROMONTORY REPORT, supra note 38, para 2.2.6, 4.4.73 
77 TOMLINSON REPORT, supra note 38, 19 
78 PROMONTORY REPORT, supra note 38, para 2.2.7 
79 Id., para 1.4³1.5. 
80 Id., para 4.1.15. 
81 TOMLINSON REPORT, supra note 38, 19 
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EHWZHHQEXVLQHVVDQGEDQNµ82 The reports also stressed the need to protect SMEs 
against unfair contract terms,83 and to develop an industry code on how banks can 
best support customers in need of business support, especially in relation to protecting 
SMEs referred to turnaround divisions.84   
 
The findings of the reviews points to a deeper issue with the role of contracts 
in SME lending, addressing which requires reconceptualising the role and function of 
financial contracts in asymmetric lending transactions.  Relationship and hierarchical 
lending represent not just different models of lending, but also different models of 
contracting.  As proponents of relational contract theory have pointed out, legal 
understandings of contract can be classified as falling within one of two archetypes: 
the discrete contract and the relational contract.  These map closely onto the ideal 
types of hierarchical and relationship lending, respectively, in that hierarchical lending 
treats the loan relationship as a discrete contract, whereas relationship lending treats 
it as a relational contract. In discrete models of contract, the terms of the transaction 
VHWRXWLQWKHSDUWLHV·IRUPDODJUHHPHQWH[KDXVWively describe WKHSDUWLHV·UHODWLRQVKLS
A financial transaction in this view is simply an instance of market exchange, 
indistinguishable from a classic instance of market exchange such as a transaction for 
the sale of a natural commodity.85 A borrower seeks purchasing power, and acquires 
it from a willing lender in exchange for the payment of a price (in the form of interest) 
for the acquired purchasing power and the provision of security to the seller in the 
event that the price is not paid on time.86  Because the relationship is simply one of 
exchange, everything that one needs to know about the relationship can be discovered 
in the terms of the contract.87  Relational models of contracting, in contrast, treat the 
formal contract as being simply one manifestation of a broader relationship, which is 
fundamentally and inextricably bound up with broader social expectations and 
understandings.88  Much like formal processes in relationship lending, formal terms in 
a financial transaction are treated as merely one dimension of a broader relationship, 
which are embedded in wider social expectations in relation to how the powers and 
claim-rights conferred by the contract on the borrower and lender will be exercised.    
 
Crucially, relational contract theory can and does draw a distinction between 
the exchange element of a contract and the relation element of the transaction, and 
recognises that they can have very different characteristics.89  This has particular 
relevance to financial lending.  There is a real sense in which a loan is about exchange 
and, to that extent the discrete model of the transaction is not incorrect as much as it 
                                                 
82 Id., 20 
83 PROMONTORY REPORT, supra note 38, para 7.23 
84 Id., para 7.19. 
85 TT Arvind, Law, creditors and crises: the untold story of  debt , in LAW AND FINANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: THE UNTOLD STORIES OF THE UK FINANCIAL MARKET (K Aldohni ed, 2017) 20 
86 Id., 24³25 
87 For a recent restatement of this position, see J Morgan, Contract Law Minimalism: A Formalist 
Restatement of Commercial Contract Law (2013) 
88 IR Macneil, The Many Futures of  Contract , 47 SO. CAL. LR 691 (1974) 
89 I.R. Macneil, The New Social Contract 130 fn 18 (1980). 
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is incomplete.  As relational contract theory points out, however, in addition to the 
exchange element, the transaction also has a relation element whose character, in this 
case, is better described as creating a framework of private governance.  In its broadest 
sense, JRYHUQDQFHFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDV´ WKHVHWWLQJRIUXOHVWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIUXOHV
DQGWKHHQIRUFHPHQWRIUXOHVµ90  It encompasses not just the rules of the game, but 
also the ability to steer the rules of the game.91  It is precisely this effect that the control 
provisions of loan agreements have, and it is precisely the manner in which these 
powers were used that have been at issue in the cases discussed in this Part.   In doing 
so, they not only supplement but also seek to supplant and displace public frameworks 
of governance, such as those contained in bankruptcy law, including in relation to the 
specific interests they prioritise and the level of protection they grant the borrower. 92   
 
The distinction relational models of transactions draw between the exchange- 
and governance-oriented dimensions of transactions therefore helps provide a deeper 
diagnosis of the impact of lender control on financial inclusivity in SME lending.  The 
role played by contracts in facilitating sourcing lending through market exchange may 
be desirable, but that does not mean their role in facilitating the creation of private 
governance systems is desirable. Relational models of contracting are often described 
as if their goals were primarily normative, and as if they did no more than argue for 
courts to take a very different approach in dealing with cases that come before them.  
This court- and litigation-focused approach to discussing and evaluating competing 
models of contract reflects a broader trend in the way in which academic legal scholars 
approach contract law,93 but it also places somewhat less emphasis on the way in which 
contracts are actually used in practice94 and, in consequence, on the regulatory and 
policy issues that arise out of such use.95  Yet relational contract theory is also, and has 
always been intended to be, an analytical approach to studying the practices of 
contracting.  The theory of relationality, when reduced to its most essential elements, 
does no more than assert that the study of legal and economic relations must be 
informed by the study of social relations and the expectations arising out of them. 96  
It does not suggest that parties, when left to govern their own contractual relations, 
will necessarily behave in relationship-enhancing or relationship-preserving ways.  As 
Macneil pointed out, contractual powers and terms have the potential to cause what 
KHWHUPV¶GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHKDUP·DQGWKHVROLGDULW\EHOLHIWKDWLVIRXQGDWLRQDOWRWKH
sustainability of private ordering supported by contract cannot survive if there is a 
widespread belief among one set of participants that other participants in that system 
                                                 
90 AM Kjær, Governance 10 (2004) 
91 Id., 7 
92 See further Part IV, inf ra. 
93 A Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously , 144 U. PA. LR 1745 (1996) 
94 S Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation of the Yellow Submarine, 
80 TUL. LR 1161 (2005) 
95 0DFDXOD\ GHVFULEHV WKLVDV EHLQJ RQH RI WKH NH\ LVVXHVVHSDUDWLQJ ¶ROG·DQG ¶QHZ·OHJDO UHDOLVP  6
Macaulay, 7KH1HZ YHUVXVWKH2OG/HJDO5HDOLVP ´7KLQJV$LQ·W:KDW7KH\8VHG7R%Hµ, 2005 WIS. LR 365 
(2005) 
96 IR Macneil, Ref lections on Relational Contract Theory af ter a Neo-classical Seminar, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS 
OF CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL AND NETWORK CONTRACTS (D Campbell, H Collins & J 
Wightman (eds), 2003) 
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of private ordering are willing to cause disproportionate harm to achieve gains for 
themselves.97   
 
The RBS and Farepak cases discussed above, and the strong public reaction 
to them, represent precisely such a situation, where the use by banks of their powers 
under financial contracts to achieve gains for themselves were perceived as causing 
disproportionate harm to SME borrowers and the broader public.  The rise of 
hierarchical lending as a source of SME finance98 is likely to have exacerbated this 
trend, in as much as hierarchical lenders are likelier to take a derelationalised approach 
to SME borrowers,99 whereas relationship lenders are likelier to take a relationship-
preserving approach.100 Whilst discrete models of financial contract can avoid 
grappling with the implications of this disjunction by taking a commodified and 
exclusively exchange-based view of lending, relational models in contrast draw 
attention to it, and to its potential impact on financial inclusion vis-à-vis SMEs and on 
the integrity of financial lending more broadly.   
 
This makes relational models of contracting superior to discrete models of 
contracting when it comes to understanding the challenges posed to financial inclusion 
by the transactional asymmetry between banks and SME borrowers, and the manner 
in which that asymmetry is reflected in the governance of the relationship.  In 
particular, if we move away from a court-centric approach to a more transactional 
approach, a focus on the relational dimensions of financial contracts gives us an 
DQDO\WLFDOWRROIRU VWXG\LQJWKH´UHODWLRQDOVDQFWLRQVDQGSULYDWHJRYHUQPHQWµ WKDW
underpin lender behaviour vis-à-vis SME borrowers,101 and the systemic issues which 
the patterns of social relations that underpin contractual relations raise for the 
sustainability and integrity of the systems of private ordering that these contracts 
support.102  Loan transactions between banks and SMEs not only embed an exchange 
in the form of the actual loan, but also a complex framework of governance that gives 
the lender considerable regulatory power over the SME.  Where the lender behaves in 
a derelationalised way, the implications of its conduct not only affect individual 
borrowers, but also have the potential to cause disproportionate harm and, through 
doing so, undermine the basis of the system of private ordering on which the debt 
system depends.  That, ultimately, is the challenge with which the law must grapple if 
it is to support financial inclusion for SMEs.  
 
 
IV. GOVERNING GOVERNANCE: TOWARDS A NEW FRAMEWORK 
FOR FINANCIALLY INCLUSIVE SME LENDING 
                                                 
97 Macneil, supra note 89, 102³104 
98 See Berger & Udell, supra note 2; Beck et al, supra note 25. 
99 Bartoli et al, supra note 18 
100 Cotugno et al, supra note 29 
101 S Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a sea of custom?  Thoughts about the ideas of Ian 
Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NORTHWESTERN UNI. LR 775, 804 (2000) 
102 Macneil, supra note 89, 64³70 (1980). 
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How, then, can the challenges identified in Parts II and III be addressed?  One option 
is to focus on the regulatory potential of private law in general.103 Yet, whilst such an 
approach can play some part in the overall legal approach to SME lending, it is unlikely 
to be sufficient in and of itself, as the example of the law of lender liability illustrates.  
The laws of a number of states in the US grant a remedy against lenders to borrowers 
who have been harmed by opportunistic lender conduct by drawing on a number of 
different theories of liability, including breach of contract,104 course of conduct,105 
implied duties of good faith,106 fraud,107 negligence,108 and fiduciary duty.109  In practice, 
however, lender liability has been limited in a number of ways.  A number of leading 
cases have involved lenders with heavy involvement in the day to day running of the  
business,110 playing an active part in boardroom battles,111 or in a relationship of trust 
and confidence with the borrower.112 The most expansive readings based on broad 
theories of unreasonable conduct, such as KMC v. Irving Trust Co,113 have come in for 
considerable criticism and in general have not been followed or read very narrowly in 
other states.114  Courts have also been reluctant to hold liable a lender whose actions 
have stayed within the scope of actions authorised by the provisions of the loan 
agreement.115 
 
The somewhat limited impact of lender liability reflects the distinction Macneil 
drew between the exchange element of a contract and the relation element of the 
transaction.  Macneil pointed out that the two were conceptually distinct, and that 
participants could benefit from the exchange even if the actual working of the relation 
was unjust.  Ignoring this, he argued, could lead to bad results in which victims of 
unjust relations could end up losing whatever benefits they may have gained from the 
                                                 
103 On the argument that private law does have regulatory potential, see TT Arvind and J Gray, The 
OLPLWV RI WHFKQRFUDF\3ULYDWHODZ·V IXWXUHLQ WKHUHJXODWRU\VWDWH , in PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY (K 
Barker, K Fairweather, & R Grantham (eds.), 2017) 
104 See e.g. Bank One, Texas, NA v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16 (5th Cir 1992); Alaska State Bank v. Fairco ,  
674 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1983) 
105 Pipken v. Thomas & Hill, 258 S.E.2d 778 (NC 1979) 
106 e.g. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc v. Uioli, Inc, 872 P.2d 1359 (Colo App 1994); KMC 
v. Irving Trust Co, 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir 1985) 
107 Crystal Springs Trout Co v. First State Bank, 732 P 2d 819 (Mont 1987) 
108 MSA Tubular Products, Inc v. First Bank & Trust Co, 869 F 2d 1422 (10th Cir 1989) 
109 Cowan Brothers, LCC v. American State Bank, 743 NW 2d 411 (SD 2007). 
110 A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc, 309 N.W.2d 285, 290-91 (Minn. 1981) (lender had a right 
RIILUVWUHIXVDOWRSXUFKDVH WKHERUURZHU·VJUDLQ&RQQRUY*UHDW:HVWHUQ6DYLQJV	/RDQ$VVRFLDWLRQ 
447 P.2d 609, 617 (Cal. 1968) (lender played an active role in home construction and had the right of 
first refusal to make loans to purchasers of homes) 
111 State National Bank of El Paso v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 678 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) 
(lender sought to prevent the election of directors, select the chief executive, and pack the board with 
their own nominees) 
112 Barnett Bank v. Hooper, 498 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1986) (relationship of trust and confidence created a 
duty to disclose material facts) 
113 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir 1985) 
114 See e.g. Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Miller, 614 N.E.2d 668 (Mass. 1993); Check Reporting Servs., Inc.  
v. Mich. Nat'l Bank, 478 N.W.2d 893, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Pavco Indus. v. First Nat'l Bank, 534 
So. 2d 572, 577 (Ala. 1988).   
115 Continental Bank, N.A. v. Everett, 964 F.2d 701 (7th Cir.) (lender not liable where all actions were 
authorised by the loan agreement). 
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exchange.116  MDQ\RIWKHSUREOHPVZLWKZKDWKDVFRPHWREHFDOOHGWKH¶UHJXODWRU\
WULOHPPD·,117 and with attempts to regulate transactions through contract law 
doctrines,118 arise out of the precise danger against which Macneil warned, where the 
law in attempting to deal with an unjust relationship fails to distinguish adequately 
between the exchange and relation elements of transactions.   
 
This point is of particular importance to financial inclusion when it comes to 
SME financing, where the exchange element of lending does in fact play a productive 
role in SME finances.  As Polanyi pointed out, exchange is not just a feature of 
individual transactions, but also a key mode and process through which individual 
transactions are integrated into a broader economic system.119  Although other modes 
of integrating transactions into economic systems do exist,120 as far as SMEs are 
concerned exchange is likely to remain the key integrative mechanism for the 
foreseeable future.  The challenge, therefore, is to separate the exchange element of 
lending from the governance element, and regulate the latter without adversely 
affecting the former, and do so in a manner that is sensitive to their broader systemic 
dimensions.121 
 
Jenny Steel and I have recently suggested a framework for considering 
regulatory goals and techniques in governing systems of private ordering underpinned 
by contract.  We argue that there are four broad families of approaches to these 
sectors, based on four views, or categorical types, of markets, which we term market-
individualism, relationalism, market-managerialism, and welfarist interventionism. In 
market-individualism, the market plays a necessary and benign role of setting prices 
and matching participants who are, for the most part, capable of self-protection.  
&RQWUDFWVKHUHKDYHDSURSHQVLW\WREHEDODQFHGDQGODZ·VSULPDU\UROHLVWRSURYLGH
adaptive support for the market.  In relationalism, the market plays an initial role, but 
is not of continuing importance, because participants are co-operative despite being 
motivated by self-LQWHUHVW&RQWUDFWVDJDLQWHQGWREHEDODQFHGDQGODZ·VUROHLVRQFH
again supportive, but with a focus on relations that endure in the medium- and long-
term.  Market managerialism presents a very different picture, in which markets play 
                                                 
116 Id, 130 fn 18 
117 The regulatory trilemma suggests that regulatory law tends to fall into one of three traps: of 
LUUHOHYDQFH LQZKLFK LWLVLJQRUHGE\WKHUHJXODWHGFRPPXQLW\RISURGXFLQJ¶GLVLntegrating effects on 
WKHVRFLDO DUHD RIOLIH· E\GDPDJLQJWKHUHJXODWHG FRPPXQLW\RU RISURGXFLQJ¶GLVLQWHJUDWLQJHIIHFWV 
RQUHJXODWRU\ ODZ LWVHOI·E\ GDPDJLQJWKH LQWHJULW\ RIWKHOHJDO V\VWHP6HH *7HXEQHU Juridif ication: 
Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
OF THE AREAS OF LABOR, CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW (G Teubner (ed), 
1987) 3²48 
118 For an argument in favour of a far-reaching acceptance of contract law as a regulatory system, see H 
COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS (2002).  For a counter-DUJXPHQW RQWKHOLPLWVWRFRQWUDFW ODZ·V
regulatory capacity, see Morgan, supra note 87, Chapters 7, 8. 
119 K Polanyi, The Economy as an Instituted Process, in TRADE AND MARKET IN THE EARLY EMPIRES: 
ECONOMIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY (C Arensberg, K Polanyi & HW Pearson (eds), 1957). 
120 Polanyi (id.) names two: reciprocity and redistribution.  
121 Cf . SL Schwarcz, Beyond Bankruptcy: Resolution as a Macroprudential Regulatory Tool , 94 NOTRE DAME 
LR 709 (2018) (discussing the balance in bankruptcy between dealing with resolving the problems of 
individual firms and those of the system as a whole). 
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an essential role, but are nevertheless prone to disintegration without external support 
because participants have a propensity to adopt flawed courses of action which serve 
immediate interests but, in the long run, have a propensity to destabilise the market 
by adversely affecting participant trust in its mechanisms.  Law, here, has to play a 
more active role in stabilising, restructuring, and managing the market, and diverting 
it away from its internally destructive tendencies.  Finally, welfarist intervention sees 
PDUNHWVDVQHFHVVDU\EXWKDYLQJDWHQGHQF\WREHRSSUHVVLYHGXHWRLWVSDUWLFLSDQWV·
tendency to create one-sided, onerous transactions.  Here, law plays an active role in 
enforcing public policy against a potentially fickle and unreliable body of market 
participants.122 
 
The task for the law in relation to SME lending is primarily one of market 
managerialism.  Whilst the market mechanism is adequate for the element of exchange 
in lending transactions, it is neither obvious nor necessarily effective as a way of 
designing governance systems.  Whilst official neutrality between relationship lending 
and hierarchical lending is therefore defensible in relation to the actual allocation of 
finance, it is neither defensible nor sustainable in relation to the actual governance 
framework for the subsequent lender-borrower relationship.  As the discussion in 
Parts II and III has shown, a relational framework is superior when it comes to matters 
of governance.   
 
What sort of mechanisms, then, might the law adopt to stabilise and 
restructure the market in the direction of a more relationally informed framework, 
which diverts it away from its tendency to cause disproportionate harm to SMEs in 
times of crisis?  A system that is potentially of particular utility in relation to situations 
such as those presented by SME lending, where the goal is to support the continuance 
of the basic exchange function but restrict broader governance functions, is the system 
UHIHUUHGWRDV´the negotiated economyµLQWKHOLWHUDWXUH.  The negotiated economy, 
DOVRVRPHWLPHVFDOOHGWKH¶QHJRWLDWLRQ-EDVHGHFRQRP\·RU¶HFRQRP\YLDSHUVXDVLRQ·123 
was devised, along with the closely related idea of ¶corporate pluralism·124 to analyse 
and explain features of governance in Scandinavia.  ,QFRQWUDVWWRWKH¶VXSHUPDUNHW·
model of governance which emphasises economic rationality and consumer choice, 125 
the negotiated economy emphasises economic co-operation, through the use of 
systems of corporate pluralism that enable all key interest groups to be represented in 
governance processes,126 the classic example being Scandinavian labour arrangements 
                                                 
122 TT Arvind and J Steele, Remapping Contract Law: Four Perceptions of  Markets in CONTRACT LAW AND 
THE LEGISLATURE: AUTONOMY, EXPECTATIONS, AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL DOCTRINE 439³445 
(TT Arvind and J Steele eds, 2020). 
123 K Nielsen & OK Pedersen, The Negotiated Economy: Ideal and History  11 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 
79, 81 (1988) 
124 See esp. S Rokkan, Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism, in POLITICAL OPPOSITIONS IN 
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES (RA Dahl ed., 1996).  For a review of the subsequent literature, see MO 
Heisler, Corporate Pluralism Revisited: Where is the Theory?, 2 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. NS 277 (1979) 
125 T Christensen, Narratives of Norwegian Governance: Elaborating the Strong State Tradition, 81 
PUB. ADMN. 163, 180-4 (2003) 
126 K Nielsen, The Mixed Economy, the Neoliberal Challenge, and the Negotiated Economy, 21 J 
SOCO-ECON 325 (1992) 
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where labour market policy has historically largely been made through collaborative 
governance arrangements between labour and employer interest groups. 127  It is easy 
to see how such a system could be translated to the world of SME lending, with model 
contracts, protocols, and procedures emerging through similar processes between 
interest groups representing SMEs and lenders.  Such a system will necessarily require 
a legal scaffold and backstop, in at least three forms: firstly, in the form of rules 
facilitating and incentivising the production of new forms of contracting;128 secondly, 
in the form of a more responsive, flexible, and relational approach to defining the 
VFRSHRIWKHUHJXODWRU·VSRZHUV;129 and thirdly, in the form of SME-friendly bankruptcy 
laws along the lines of the reforms recently introduced in the US through SBRA. 130  
Such a system will, however, be superior both to the current state of deregulated 
private governance as well as to more intrusive and coercive forms of regulation, in 
supporting broader dimensions of SME financial inclusion. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although financial inclusion as a policy objective has multiple dimensions, the focus 
of the debate on financial inclusion for SMEs has largely been on the issue of 
enhancing SME access to finance.  This article has shown that more attention needs 
to be paid to the issue of reshaping lender practices to make the delivery of finance to 
SMEs more responsible and sustainable.  The terms of SME financing agreements 
offer considerable scope for lenders to engage in opportunistic or predatory behaviour 
and, as this article has shown, there is evidence to suggest both that this is a problem, 
and that it causes material financial distress to SMEs and beyond.   Against that 
background, this article has argued that the law needs to take a less neutral approach 
that is more favourable to relational lending practices.  It has also suggested a range 
                                                 
127 See K Nielsen & OK Pedersen (eds), Forhandlingsøkonomi i Norden (1989) 
128 An example of a very similar framework in a commercial, common law context is provided by the 
8.·V +RXVLQJ*UDQWV &RQVWUXFWLRQ DQG5HJHQHUDWLRQ $FW  ZKLFK ZDV PRWLYDWHGE\ FRPPRQ
practices in the construction industry which, cumulatively, were seriously destabilising the finances of 
SME contractors and which expressly sought to incentivise the construction industry to create new 
contract forms which would reform these practices.  For an overview and analysis, see C Ellis, Regulating 
Commercial Contracts: What can we Learn f rom Part II of  the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 
1996?, in CONTRACT LAW AND THE LEGISLATURE: AUTONOMY, EXPECTATIONS, AND THE MAKING 
OF LEGAL DOCTRINE 329-361 (TT Arvind and J Steele eds, 2020) 
129 The 2019 report of the Treasury Committee of the UK House of Commons on the perimeter of 
regulation forms a useful starting point for charting the shape of these reforms.  The Committee 
recommended that more clarity be provided to customers of banks when the banks were engaged in 
unregulated activities (see Treasury Committee, supra note 72, para 13-18) and that the FCA be given a 
formal statutory power to review and formally recommend changes to its perimeter of regulation (see 
Treasury Committee, supra note 72, para 23-31).  These changes, if embedded in a broader turn to a 
negotiated economy, would have helped redress many of the problems that SMEs encountered in their 
dealings with the GRG. 
130 Despite the SME-friendly intentions of SBRA, a literature has already begun to emerge examining 
how lenders can circumvent its provisions and maintain their superior position over small business 
borrowers under the new regulatory regime created by the Act.  See e.g. CG Bradley, The New Small 
Business Bankruptcy Game: Strategies for Creditors Under the Small Business Reorganization Act , 28 AM. BANKR. 
INST. LR 251 (2020). 
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of techniques, grounded in the established models of negotiated economies and 
corporate pluralism, which can help achieve this end.  Although the challenge of 
fostering responsible and sustainable lending practices is not a simple one, it is one 
that can be met with the right combination of approaches. 
